Stoddard Online

THE REAL REASON THAT WILBERT COFFIN HANGED

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.As soon as the federal government became involved in the Wilbert Coffin affair, it ceased being a case of probable unfair and unjust principles that were levelled against a defendant. It would fast become a political football between the province of Quebec, and the federal government of Canada, with the United States of America standing by ready to gobble up the spoils of what remained. This statement can now be easily proven. Documented proof still exists to this day that substantiates that claim.
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It is no longer a secret that premier Maurice Duplessis of Quebec hated The Right Honourable Louis St. Laurent, the prime minister of Canada. It is also no secret that St. Laurent carried a hatred just as large for Duplessis. The American administration in Washington DC knew this, and they would use these facts behind the scenes to foster their own agenda with reference to Canada. They would do it smoothly, they would do it diligently, all the while making it appear that it was Ottawa who had smoothed out the edges. If the boys in Ottawa could be manipulated into a situation where they looked good to themselves, the electorate in Canada would hopefully look favourable at them again as election time was looming.
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Prime Minister St. Laurent, and his band of loyals known as the federal cabinet must at all costs appear unified. It was paramount, affairs must be carried out accordingly. It was imperative. If the liberal government under St. Laurent was to have a chance of another term in Ottawa, the electors in Quebec must be kept onside, with or without the personal support of Duplessis.
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One must consider here, this period of Canadian history and the way that it was put together would stand out as the very catalyst in the drafting of an accord affecting the two largest trading partners on the planet. The United States Of America was not about to sit with their engines in idle. Let's face it. They had the most to lose.
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Canada had what the USA needed most, that was resources. This was post Second War, and the half way point of the century. There was an even bigger fish to fry. In 1954, Canada and The United States had embarked upon a joint venture known as The St. Lawrence Seaway. This would open both countries to vast untold fortunes in both importing and exporting. As is hoped with any vast venture such as this project, both partners would hopefully emerge as winners, except it was Canada who gave up the most to achieve the goal. This was another reason that the USA would tread carefully in her quest to control. Canadian authorities must feel that the American administration was bowing to them.
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You may be wondering what all of this has to do with the Wilbert Coffin affair. That is a fair question. From this point forward, you are going to be introduced to a new cast of characters with reference to the Wilbert Coffin affair. You will see how the above ties in directly with Regina Vs Coffin. It will appear to be a tangled web of deceit, manipulation, and corruption. Trust me, it is all of those. I also caution you. There will be parts of this that will require an indepth reading and discovery by yourselves, but if you take the time, you will see the true picture emerge. If you are not prepared to do this, then you may be wasting your time. You must remember, this was not put together fifty plus years ago in such a way that generations down the road could easily figure it out. Clearly, it was meant to deceive. Here is my documented report, although a nastier more cynical person than myself might have titled the proceeding "The United States Of America and Regina Vs Coffin" instead of simply Regina Vs Coffin. It is now necessary that we go back into time and work forward.
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Having failed to gain a new trial for Wilbert Coffin, his defense lawyers, Francois Gravel, and Arthur Maloney had made the decision to petition the federal cabinet to review the case and render a decision based on that review. The date was September, 1955. Other than a motion to approve a pay raise for themselves, politicians are not known to be expedient. The Coffin affair would be no exception. They did not know a lot about it, and anyway, it was something that had taken place down in eastern Quebec in Duplessis country. True, they wanted to look good to the people, but no matter which way they leaned, there would be a force against them. They would avoid the wrath of Duplessis if at all possible, as otherwise, they would be in a double jeopardy situation, and not a nice position to be in.
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This is where it begins to get a bit complicated. Up until now most Canadians familiar with the Wilbert Coffin case had heard of the displeasure expressed by the United States of America for three of its citizens being murdered in Quebec. True, they were upset, and of course had good reason to be. The United States Ambassador to Canada, the Honourable John Foster Dulles had touted the theory to Duplessis and to St. Laurent that the affair would have grave consequences on the tourist business, especially, from the Federation of American Sportsmen. It would have that effect to be certain, however, it went much deeper. It went much deeper with St. Laurent and the cabinet, however, Duplessis would not be made aware of the hidden implications. He was left right where all wanted him to be, thinking that the Americans were putting pressure on him with reference to the tourist trade.
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The following is the first thread of the web. It involves legal wranglings between Canada and the United States over the extradition of two individuals, W. H. Link and H. M. Green to face charges in the United States on securities fraud. The problem stemmed from December 1954 when Chief Justice W. B. Scott of the Quebec Superior Court refused to extradite these individuals to face justice in the USA. The United States administration replied by making application to the Supreme Court Of Canada to appeal this decision. The Supreme Court refused the appeal on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction in extradiction matters. The following exerpts from a confidential memo are self explanatory in this matter.
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The following is a memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Ottawa, October 24th, 1955

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EXTRADITION, POLITICAL REASONS FOR SUBMITTING LINK AND GREEN

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REFERENCE TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

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1. Scope of Memorandum

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The Minister of Justice is presenting to the Cabinet, at this week's Cabinet meeting, a draft submission to the Governor in Council, recommending that two questions be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for hearing and consideration in regard to the Scott Judgment in the Link and Green extradition case. The Minister of Justice's draft submission to the Governor in Council will explain the legal position. The purpose of this memorandum is to set out the political reasons that make this action necessary.

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In December, 1954 Associate Chief Justice W.B. Scott of the Superior Court of Quebec, Montreal District, refused the application of the United States Government for the extradition of W.H. Link and H.M. Green on charges involving fraudulent dealings with securities under the Extradition Act, pursuant to the 1951 Supplementary Extradition Convention. The United States Government applied to the Supreme Court of Canada for leave to appeal the decision. The Supreme Court refused the application. The Court did not pass on the substance of the judgment, as it considered that it did not have jurisdiction to hear appeals in extradition cases.

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Views of the Minister of Justice

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The Minister of Justice is of the opinion that it is important to the administration of the Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States that this reference should be made to the Supreme Court of Canada.

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Conclusions:
By making this reference to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Canadian Government will be taking the measures open to it to meet the problem of fraudulent securities offerings across the border. Should the Canadian Government, on the other hand, decide not to make this reference to the Supreme Court of Canada, an awkward situation would be likely to develop. The United States Government would be frustrated in its efforts to solve the fraudulent securities problem and it would be in a position to place the blame on the Canadian Government. Such a situation clearly must be avoided if at all possible.

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For these reasons the Department of External Affairs supports the recommendation of the Minister of Justice that the Scott Judgment be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada.

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J. L[ÉGER

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It was necessary to show you this because it will form the basis of subsequent parts which will involve Regina Vs Coffin. The name above, J. Leger, refers to the under secretary of the Minister Of State for External Affairs. The Minister of External Affairs during this period was Lester B Pearson, who of course is no stranger to Canadian politics. He would go on to win a Nobel Peace prize, and become Prime Minister of Canada.

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As you can see, the Americans were mad at Ottawa. Justice Scott had muddied the waters when as a Quebec Superior Justice, he refused to extradite two fugitives whom Washington wanted, and then Ottawa snubbed the US Administration when the Supreme Court Of Canada refused to grant their appeal. The bottom line here of course is that Washington couldn't have cared less about Duplessis in Quebec, nor,about the Canadian federal government in Ottawa. It was a situation that needed to be straightened out, and it would require calm heads to do it. This is where the plot begins to thicken. . .

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From here it is necessary that we make a quick stop in Washington D C. The U S Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Brownell, is planning a trip to Canada. He is not going to Ottawa. He is going to Toronto to address The Canadian Club. He has been advised to maximize this trip to include business other than his speech to The Canadian Club. The following "Confidential" memo from the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney sums up the content of business to be conducted on the trip.

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Memorandum by Ambassador in United States

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CONFIDENTIAL

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[Washington], November 8th, 1955

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SECURITY FRAUDS; EXTRADITION; LINK AND GREENCASE136 CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF JUSTICEAND THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, AT TORONTO, NOVEMBER 7, 1955.

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It had been arranged through the Embassy that advantage should be taken of the presence of the United States Attorney General in Toronto on November 7th, for a private and informal discussion of this subject with the Minister of Justice, who was to be there for Mr. Brownell's speech to the Canadian Club. It had also been agreed that the United States Ambassador and I should be present. This had first been suggested at the meeting on September [26th], in Ottawa, of the Canada-United States Committee on Economic Affairs, when the Secretary of State had referred to the United States Government's concern.137

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The conversation took place in Mr. Brownell's suite at the Royal York Hotel on the afternoon of November 7th. It was agreed by all present that it would be entirely informal and private - a frank exchange of information and views.

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The Minister, after referring to the suggestion that a "reference" be made to the Supreme Court of Canada on the points of law arising out of the judgement of Associate Chief Justice Scott of the Quebec Superior Court and describing briefly the law and procedure which govern such references, went on to explain to the Attorney General the position of a current reference to the Supreme Court in Regina v. Coffin.

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This (Coffin) reference raised difficult and delicate issues for the Federal Government in regard to the administration of justice in the Province of Quebec, since the Supreme Court would appear to be reviewing the verdict of a Quebec Court after the unanimous refusal of an appeal by the Provincial appellate court. The Government, nevertheless, had felt bound to proceed with this reference (for reasons which Mr. Garson had explained) and the hearing would take place in December.

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For the Government, the Minister went on, to make now a second reference to the Supreme Court which would reflect on the Quebec Courts (since it would at least indirectly impugn the finding of Chief Justice Scott in the Link and Green case) would exacerbate an already complicated and delicate situation. In the opinion of the Federal authorities the Scott judgement was bad law and had the effect of frustrating the purposes of the Extradition Treaty of 1952 between Canada and the United States. The Canadian authorities, like those of the United States, were anxious to rectify the position and restore the régime which the Treaty had intended.

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In due course, Mr. Garson felt, it should be possible for a reference to be made which would achieve this purpose. The Government would wish to have this done just as soon as possible.

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The Minister said that Canadian authorities had read with interest a proposal put forward by the General Counsel for the United States Securities Exchange Commission that the Extradition Treaty should be amended to provide for an appellate procedure. The Canadian Department of Justice would be interested in exploring this possibility (which from the Government's point of view would provide, at least prima facie, a politically easier course than a reference to the Supreme Court), but before doing so wished to know whether the United States Department of Justice had considered fully the implications of such an innovation in extradition procedures. Having regard to the fact that it would seem to be politically impossible to provide an appeal for the state without similar provision for the accused, Mr. Garson was inclined to think that the delays in litigation caused by such appeals might make them unworkable.

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The Attorney General said that Mr. Timbers' proposal had not been examined fully by his Department and was not now being put forward as a suggestion to the Canadian Government. He personally was inclined to think that it would be a doubtful expedient; as Mr. Garson had observed, the delays involved would probably be intolerable.

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If, Mr. Brownell continued, the situation could be restored to the pre-Link and Green position by a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada, this would be preferable from the United States point of view, provided that the lapse of time before a judgement were obtained were not too great. United States authorities were already subject to very considerable pressures and these would build up seriously when Congress got under way in January. What length of time did the Minister foresee before the Canadian Government would be willing to refer the question to the Supreme Court?

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Mr. Garson replied that unfortunately it was not possible to be precise on the timing of a reference. If his colleagues agreed to a reference (and he was awaiting the return of the Secretary of State for External Affairs before taking the matter up in Cabinet) the timing would be affected by the course of the Coffin reference and hearing. The Canadian authorities were also anxious to clear up the present unsatisfactory situation with regard to extradition for security frauds, but had obviously to take account of the considerations which he had set forth.

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I suggested, in attempting to sum up, that the two Governments had the same objective, namely to establish as promptly as possible the régime contemplated when the Treaty was negotiated. The baleful effect of the Scott judgement should be got rid of as soon as could be. The problem was one of method and timing - not objective. To this all present agreed.

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The Canadian position, I continued, had been frankly explained to the Attorney General but he would be unable to make this explanation to those in Washington who were pressing him for action. It seemed to me important, before any statement were made by the United States authorities, that agreement should be reached on the form of such statement. To this, too, there was agreement.

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Mr. Brownell expressed his appreciation of the full and candid explanation which Mr. Garson had made and it was agreed that the Minister and the Attorney General would keep in close touch with one another, through me.

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It was agreed that, in the circumstances, no purpose would be served by further suggestions from Canadian Counsel for the United States Department of Justice or others, with regard to any references that might be made to the Supreme Court or other procedures in this matter.

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On the following day, returning to Washington, I mentioned to Mr. Brownell the importance, if any reference was to be made to the Supreme Court, of avoiding any impression that this procedure was being taken under pressure from United States authorities. He readily understood this and agreed to caution his officials. When the time came that something had to be said, the two Governments would agree on the form of statement.

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A.D.P. HEENEY

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Here is a note at the bottom of the Ambassador's letter. I find this troubling in a democratic society.

"The version of the memorandum reprinted here was amended in late November to take into account Garson's comments on Heeney's original draft which was removed from the files and destroyed."

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Just to make things clear, the name Garson refers to Canadian Minister Of Justice, The Honourable Stuart Sinclair Garson. I find it very troubling to see a federal Minister Of Justice having files removed and destroyed.

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As you read this, you can perhaps see how Canada had dug a hole for herself in her relations with the United States. This all stemmed from the court decision in Quebec Superior Court by Chief Justice Scott in his refusal to order extradition proceedings against Link and Green. Equally stupid though was the refusal of The Supreme Court of Canada to hear an appeal of the process. Throughout it all, Wilbert Coffin was being used as a pawn. He was the sacrificial lamb in all these proceedings.

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In their quest to crawl back into the fold with the United States, the federal cabinet in Ottawa pulled out all the stops. There was more butt kissing at the diplomatic level in Ottawa in the final three months of 1955 than there had been in the decade since the war concluded. It is prudent to show you an example of that fact before we move on. Here is an exerpt from a memo sent by The Honourable Lester Pearson to the American Ambassador, John Foster Dulles, at a joint meeting between the two countries. You will note that the minutes of this meeting are designated as "Secret."

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Summary Record of Meeting of Joint Canada-United States Committee

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SECRET

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Ottawa, September 26, 1955

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Mr. Pearson as Chairman expressed the sympathy of the Canadian side with President Eisenhower in his illness.127 It was to be hoped that he would soon be restored to his full health and vigour. Not only the Canadian members but all of Canada appreciated the President's attitude towards trade matters and the efforts which he was making to improve international relations generally. As the leader of the Allied Forces during the war and during the early period of NATO's history, President Eisenhower had come to belong to Canada and the other North Atlantic countries as well as to the United States.

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As you can see, The United States could do no wrong. You will note the highest praise extended to then President Eisenhower. One would think that he single handedly won the war, even though the war in Europe was practically concluded when the United States decided to enter it. Pearson obviously forgot about the thousands of Canadians who paid the ultimate sacrifice on the battlefields by his praise of the American president. The bottom line here is simply that the federal government was willing to go to the outer limits to make the United States happy during this period.

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Here are some exerpts from a letter written by Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Heeney. It is written to The Honourable Lester Pearson. If you really digest the contents of this letter, it says it all.

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Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Dear Mr. Pearson,

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On November 9th I wrote you a personal letter? reporting upon the conversation in Toronto between your colleague, the Minister of Justice, and the United States Attorney General concerning extradition in relation to security frauds.

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In speaking to me yesterday, Mr. Garson said that he would expect you to bring up this subject in Cabinet shortly. When you did so he would be willing to agree to a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada which would rectify the present unsatisfactory situation. In this connection he mentioned again the desirability of having the question put to the Supreme Court in such a way as to avoid explicit reference to the judgement of Associate Chief Justice Scott, whence our difficulties arise. On the timing of the reference to the Court, Mr. Garson would be guided largely by the views of your Quebec colleagues, but he himself would have no objection to the reference being made reasonably soon.

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In raising the matter in Cabinet as one involving our relations with the United States, you would certainly be justified in saying to your colleagues that the present situation is one which has caused, and continues to cause, difficulties between us. Furthermore, the pressure upon the Administration to take action of some kind within the competence of the United States executive and legislature may be expected to increase sharply once Congress reassembles after Christmas.

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As you will note from my memorandum of November 8th, Mr. Brownell has agreed to consult us when he feels it necessary to make some public statement on this subject. I would hope that by that time we will be in a position to announce the reference to the Supreme Court along the lines now favoured by your colleague, the Minister of Justice.

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One final consideration - from the point of view of External Affairs, the sooner the reference is made and announced the better; from the point of view of the Government in Ottawa too I should think it is highly desirable that the reference should be made before the clamour in this country increases and the Government are put in the position of acting in response to public pressure from the United States.

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Yours sincerely,

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A.D.P. HEENEY

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.As the wheels turn, the federal government is becoming mired deeper and deeper. They are faced with straightening out some bad law from Quebec. If they don't fix the decision by Chief Justice Scott from the Quebec Superior Court, the Americans will be all over them for evermore. Canada could also become a haven for criminals from the American side of the border, as the court decision did not force them to be extradited. Maurice Duplessis will be furious.

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On the other hand the federal cabinet has been asked to review the Wilbert Coffin affair. The appeal had been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada, so any meddling on this case would again upset Duplessis. The decision now necessary for cabinet to decide was, did they really want to review The Coffin affair and get the government of Duplessis mad again? Wilbert Coffin through his lawyers was asking for a full review and an order for a new trial, based on the fact that he did not receive a fair trial and process from the beginning.

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In a following memo to the Attorney General of the United States through Ambassador Heeney, Canadian Minister of Justice, the Honourable Stuart Garson would announce that a solution had been found that should bring the matter to conclusion. As a result, the decision by Chief Justice Scott would be reversed. As well, the federal government would be free and clear of a ruling on the Regina Vs Coffin affair. Ottawa would come out not looking like they had bent to pressure from the American administration. The following extract designated "Top Secret" are from cabinet conclusions pertaining to the decision affecting the Coffin affair.

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Extract from Cabinet Conclusions

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"Top Secret"

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Circumstances had made it appear desirable to make a rather unusual reference to the Supreme Court in the recent Coffin murder case.135r It would seem undesirable to take unorthodox action with regard to this extradition difficulty so soon after the Coffin incident. It might, perhaps, be preferable to wait until such time as another judgment similar to the Scott judgment of December 17th, 1954, was rendered before taking any such action

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On the other hand, unless some action were taken, the government of Canada would likely be blamed for doing nothing to prevent the fraudulent use of the mails by unscrupulous brokers

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The Cabinet noted the report of the Minister of Justice and deferred decision on a proposed reference to the Supreme Court with regard to difficulties which had recently been encountered in the administration of the Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States, pending further consideration at a subsequent meeting when the Secretary of State for External Affairs could be present

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On October 14, 1955 Cabinet asked the Supreme Court of Canada to review the conviction in Quebec courts of Wilbert Coffin for the 1953 murder of Richard Lindsay after suggestions were made that Coffin had not received a fair trial. Cabinet asked the court to answer the following question: "If the application made by Wilbert Coffin for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada had been granted on any of the grounds alleged on the said application, what disposition of the appeal would now be made by the court?"

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It is the last paragraph above that tossed Wilbert Coffin into the wind. His lawyers had asked the federal cabinet to review the case. This would have taken it from day one. It would have reviewed the inquest jury process, it would have reviewed the jury selection process, it would have reviewed suppressed evidence, and it would have reviewed the judges charge to the jury. None of this was ever done of course. The cabinet simply sent the case back to the Supreme Court with the above question. In reality the cabinet knew what the decision of the Supreme Court would be. They were the ones who had made the decision in the first place. In a round about way the government was asking the Supreme Court to re-rule and make a decision on their original ruling. One does not have to be smart to figure that a Supreme Court of Canada Justice is not about to rule against his own ruling.

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Unfortunately the government of Canada was willing to throw out and sacrifice one man's last chance for justice in this country. It could have easily been avoided. It required nothing more than an order in council to further delay the hanging of Wilbert Coffin until such time that a full and proper conclusion be reached with respect to the capital punishment being carried out.

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Fifty-one years later the federal government is once again being asked to investigate this case as a miscarriage of justice. It is a miscarriage of justice because the government allowed it to be that way.

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I am firmly of the opinion that a complete review of this case should take place. Simply asking that a review be done based on the same criteria that was done over fifty years ago is not enough. A complete review must include the admission of new evidence, meaning both evidence that was suppressed and omitted, and evidence that has surfaced since the original proceeding. There are witnesses still alive who gave statements prior to the original trial. It is imperative that these people be heard because it was their intention to give evidence. There was evidence concerning Jeeps and vehicles that was never brought forward. Again, this evidence must be presented, because originally it was intended to be part of the process.

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It is important to note that I have raised very serious concerns with reference to autopsy reports on the crime victims. A murder weapon was never found, no spent cartridges cases or bullets, no broken bones and yet the victims were declared to have died of gunshot wounds. Perforations in clothing clearly indicate they are much too large for any calibre of bullet available. There were marks on one bone, and the medical examiner stated in court the marks could have been made by a forest animal.

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In order that a full and impartial review be made of this case, it is necessary that all these things must be looked at and considered. Several of these elements made up the scope of what the federal government was being asked to do in 1955. Sadly, they chose to not do that. If they had done what was asked of them, Wilbert Coffin would not have hanged on February 10, 1956. By displaying themselves as a spineless bunch of creatures, they were able to uphold themselves as weak and inept and afraid of Duplessis, and at the same time, display their loyalty to the United States Of America as puppets on a string.

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Lew Stoddard

Posted to site February 28, 2007